

ARR32-C. Ensure size arguments for variable length arrays are in a valid range

Variable length arrays (VLAs), a conditionally supported language feature, are essentially the same as traditional C arrays except that they are declared with a size that is not a constant integer expression and can be declared only at block scope or function prototype scope and no linkage. When supported, a variable length array can be declared

```
{ /* Block scope */
  char vla[size];
}
```

where the integer expression `size` and the declaration of `vla` are both evaluated at runtime. If the size argument supplied to a variable length array is not a positive integer value, the behavior is undefined. (See [undefined behavior 75](#).) Additionally, if the magnitude of the argument is excessive, the program may behave in an unexpected way. An attacker may be able to leverage this behavior to overwrite critical program data [[Griffiths 2006](#)]. The programmer must ensure that size arguments to variable length arrays, especially those derived from untrusted data, are in a valid range.

Because variable length arrays are a conditionally supported feature of C11, their use in portable code should be guarded by testing the value of the macro `__STDC_NO_VLA__`. Implementations that do not support variable length arrays indicate it by setting `__STDC_NO_VLA__` to the integer constant 1.

Noncompliant Code Example

In this noncompliant code example, a variable length array of size `size` is declared. The `size` is declared as `size_t` in compliance with [INT01-C. Use `size_t` or `size_t` for all integer values representing the size of an object](#).

```
#include <stddef.h>

extern void do_work(int *array, size_t size);

void func(size_t size) {
  int vla[size];
  do_work(vla, size);
}
```

However, the value of `size` may be zero or excessive, potentially giving rise to a security [vulnerability](#).

Compliant Solution

This compliant solution ensures the `size` argument used to allocate `vla` is in a valid range (between 1 and a programmer-defined maximum); otherwise, it uses an algorithm that relies on dynamic memory allocation. The solution also avoids unsigned integer wrapping that, given a sufficiently large value of `size`, would cause `malloc` to allocate insufficient storage for the array.

```
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

enum { MAX_ARRAY = 1024 };
extern void do_work(int *array, size_t size);

void func(size_t size) {
  if (0 == size || SIZE_MAX / sizeof(int) < size) {
    /* Handle error */
    return;
  }
  if (size < MAX_ARRAY) {
    int vla[size];
    do_work(vla, size);
  } else {
    int *array = (int *)malloc(size * sizeof(int));
    if (array == NULL) {
      /* Handle error */
    }
    do_work(array, size);
    free(array);
  }
}
```

Noncompliant Code Example (sizeof)

The following noncompliant code example defines `A` to be a variable length array and then uses the `sizeof` operator to compute its size at runtime. When the function is called with an argument greater than `SIZE_MAX / (N1 * sizeof (int))`, the runtime `sizeof` expression may wrap around, yielding a result that is smaller than the mathematical product `N1 * n2 * sizeof (int)`. The call to `malloc()`, when successful, will then allocate storage for fewer than `n2` elements of the array, causing one or more of the final `memset()` calls in the `for` loop to write past the end of that storage.

```
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>

enum { N1 = 4096 };

void *func(size_t n2) {
    typedef int A[n2][N1];

    A *array = malloc(sizeof(A));
    if (!array) {
        /* Handle error */
        return NULL;
    }

    for (size_t i = 0; i != n2; ++i) {
        memset(array[i], 0, N1 * sizeof(int));
    }

    return array;
}
```

Compliant Solution (sizeof)

This compliant solution prevents `sizeof` wrapping by detecting the condition before it occurs and avoiding the subsequent computation when the condition is detected.

```
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>

enum { N1 = 4096 };

void *func(size_t n2) {
    if (n2 > SIZE_MAX / (N1 * sizeof(int))) {
        /* Prevent sizeof wrapping */
        return NULL;
    }

    typedef int A[n2][N1];

    A *array = malloc(sizeof(A));
    if (!array) {
        /* Handle error */
        return NULL;
    }

    for (size_t i = 0; i != n2; ++i) {
        memset(array[i], 0, N1 * sizeof(int));
    }

    return array;
}
```

Implementation Details

Microsoft

Variable length arrays are not supported by Microsoft compilers.

Risk Assessment

Failure to properly specify the size of a variable length array may allow arbitrary code execution or result in stack exhaustion.

Rule	Severity	Likelihood	Remediation Cost	Priority	Level
ARR32-C	High	Probable	High	P6	L2

Automated Detection

Tool	Version	Checker	Description
Coverity	2017.07	REVERSE_NEGATIVE	Fully implemented
LDRA tool suite	9.7.1	621 S	Enhanced enforcement
Parasoft C/C++test	10.4.2	CERT_C-ARR32-a	Ensure the size of the variable length array is in valid range
Polyspace Bug Finder	R2019a	CERT C: Rule ARR32-C	Checks for: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Memory allocation with tainted size• Tainted size of variable length array Rule fully covered.
PRQA QA-C	9.5	1051, 2052	Partially implemented
Cppcheck	1.66	negativeArraySize	Context sensitive analysis Will warn only if given size is negative
TrustInSoft Analyzer	1.38	alloca_bounds	Exhaustively verified.

Related Vulnerabilities

Search for [vulnerabilities](#) resulting from the violation of this rule on the [CERT website](#).

Related Guidelines

[Key here](#) (explains table format and definitions)

Taxonomy	Taxonomy item	Relationship
CERT C Secure Coding Standard	INT01-C. Use rsize_t or size_t for all integer values representing the size of an object	Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship
ISO/IEC TR 24772:2013	Unchecked Array Indexing [XYZ]	Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship
ISO/IEC TS 17961:2013	Tainted, potentially mutilated, or out-of-domain integer values are used in a restricted sink [taintsink]	Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship
CWE 2.11	CWE-758	2017-06-29: CERT: Rule subset of CWE

CERT-CWE Mapping Notes

[Key here](#) for mapping notes

CWE-129 and ARR32-C

Intersection(CWE-188, EXP39-C) = ∅

ARR32-C addresses specifying the size of a variable-length array (VLA). CWE-129 addresses invalid array indices, not array sizes.

CWE-758 and ARR32-C

Independent(INT34-C, INT36-C, MSC37-C, FLP32-C, EXP33-C, EXP30-C, ERR34-C, ARR32-C)

CWE-758 = Union(ARR32-C, list) where list =

- Undefined behavior that results from anything other than too large a VLA dimension.

CWE-119 and ARR32-C

- Intersection(CWE-119, ARR32-C) = \emptyset
- ARR32-C is not about providing a valid buffer but reading/writing outside it. It is about providing an invalid buffer, or one that exhausts the stack.

Bibliography

[Griffiths 2006]

