

# FIO34-C. Distinguish between characters read from a file and EOF or WEOF

The `EOF` macro represents a negative value that is used to indicate that the file is exhausted and no data remains when reading data from a file. `EOF` is an example of an [in-band error indicator](#). In-band error indicators are problematic to work with, and the creation of new in-band-error indicators is discouraged by [ERR02-C. Avoid in-band error indicators](#).

The byte I/O functions `fgetc()`, `getc()`, and `getchar()` all read a character from a stream and return it as an `int`. (See [STR00-C. Represent characters using an appropriate type](#).) If the stream is at the end of the file, the end-of-file indicator for the stream is set and the function returns `EOF`. If a read error occurs, the error indicator for the stream is set and the function returns `EOF`. If these functions succeed, they cast the character returned into an unsigned `char`.

Because `EOF` is negative, it should not match any unsigned character value. However, this is only true for [implementations](#) where the `int` type is wider than `char`. On an implementation where `int` and `char` have the same width, a character-reading function can read and return a valid character that has the same bit-pattern as `EOF`. This could occur, for example, if an attacker inserted a value that looked like `EOF` into the file or data stream to alter the behavior of the program.

The C Standard requires only that the `int` type be able to represent a maximum value of +32767 and that a `char` type be no larger than an `int`. Although uncommon, this situation can result in the integer constant expression `EOF` being indistinguishable from a valid character; that is, `(int)(unsigned char)65535 == -1`. Consequently, failing to use `feof()` and `ferror()` to detect end-of-file and file errors can result in incorrectly identifying the `EOF` character on rare implementations where `sizeof(int) == sizeof(char)`.

This problem is much more common when reading wide characters. The `fgetwc()`, `getwc()`, and `getwchar()` functions return a value of type `wint_t`. This value can represent the next wide character read, or it can represent `WEOF`, which indicates end-of-file for wide character streams. On most implementations, the `wchar_t` type has the same width as `wint_t`, and these functions can return a character indistinguishable from `WEOF`.

In the UTF-16 character set, `0xFFFF` is guaranteed not to be a character, which allows `WEOF` to be represented as the value `-1`. Similarly, all UTF-32 characters are positive when viewed as a signed 32-bit integer. All widely used character sets are designed with at least one value that does not represent a character. Consequently, it would require a custom character set designed without consideration of the C programming language for this problem to occur with wide characters or with ordinary characters that are as wide as `int`.

The C Standard `feof()` and `ferror()` functions are not subject to the problems associated with character and integer sizes and should be used to verify end-of-file and file errors for susceptible implementations [[Kettlewell 2002](#)]. Calling both functions on each iteration of a loop adds significant overhead, so a good strategy is to temporarily trust `EOF` and `WEOF` within the loop but verify them with `feof()` and `ferror()` following the loop.

## Noncompliant Code Example

This noncompliant code example loops while the character `c` is not `EOF`:

```
#include <stdio.h>

void func(void) {
    int c;

    do {
        c = getchar();
    } while (c != EOF);
}
```

Although `EOF` is guaranteed to be negative and distinct from the value of any unsigned character, it is not guaranteed to be different from any such value when converted to an `int`. Consequently, when `int` has the same width as `char`, this loop may terminate prematurely.

## Compliant Solution (Portable)

This compliant solution uses `feof()` to test for end-of-file and `ferror()` to test for errors:

```

#include <stdio.h>

void func(void) {
    int c;

    do {
        c = getchar();
    } while (c != EOF);
    if (feof(stdin)) {
        /* Handle end of file */
    } else if (ferror(stdin)) {
        /* Handle file error */
    } else {
        /* Received a character that resembles EOF; handle error */
    }
}

```

## Noncompliant Code Example (Nonportable)

This noncompliant code example uses an assertion to ensure that the code is executed only on architectures where `int` is wider than `char` and `EOF` is guaranteed not to be a valid character value. However, this code example is noncompliant because the variable `c` is declared as a `char` rather than an `int`, making it possible for a valid character value to compare equal to the value of the `EOF` macro when `char` is signed because of sign extension:

```

#include <assert.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdio.h>

void func(void) {
    char c;
    static_assert(UCHAR_MAX < UINT_MAX, "FIO34-C violation");

    do {
        c = getchar();
    } while (c != EOF);
}

```

Assuming that a `char` is a signed 8-bit type and an `int` is a 32-bit type, if `getchar()` returns the character value `'\xff'` (decimal 255), it will be interpreted as `EOF` because this value is sign-extended to `0xFFFFFFFF` (the value of `EOF`) to perform the comparison. (See [STR34-C. Cast characters to unsigned char before converting to larger integer sizes.](#))

## Compliant Solution (Nonportable)

This compliant solution declares `c` to be an `int`. Consequently, the loop will terminate only when the file is exhausted.

```

#include <assert.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <limits.h>

void func(void) {
    int c;
    static_assert(UCHAR_MAX < UINT_MAX, "FIO34-C violation");

    do {
        c = getchar();
    } while (c != EOF);
}

```

## Noncompliant Code Example (Wide Characters)

In this noncompliant example, the result of the call to the C standard library function `getwc()` is stored into a variable of type `wchar_t` and is subsequently compared with `WEOF`:

```

#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <wchar.h>

enum { BUFFER_SIZE = 32 };

void g(void) {
    wchar_t buf[BUFFER_SIZE];
    wchar_t wc;
    size_t i = 0;

    while ((wc = getwc(stdin)) != L'\n' && wc != WEOF) {
        if (i < (BUFFER_SIZE - 1)) {
            buf[i++] = wc;
        }
    }
    buf[i] = L'\0';
}

```

This code suffers from two problems. First, the value returned by `getwc()` is immediately converted to `wchar_t` before being compared with `WEOF`. Second, there is no check to ensure that `wint_t` is wider than `wchar_t`. Both of these problems make it possible for an attacker to terminate the loop prematurely by supplying the wide-character value matching `WEOF` in the file.

## Compliant Solution (Portable)

This compliant solution declares `c` to be a `wint_t` to match the integer type returned by `getwc()`. Furthermore, it does not rely on `WEOF` to determine end-of-file definitively.

```

#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <wchar.h>

enum { BUFFER_SIZE = 32 }

void g(void) {
    wchar_t buf[BUFFER_SIZE];
    wint_t wc;
    size_t i = 0;

    while ((wc = getwc(stdin)) != L'\n' && wc != WEOF) {
        if (i < BUFFER_SIZE - 1) {
            buf[i++] = wc;
        }
    }

    if (feof(stdin) || ferror(stdin)) {
        buf[i] = L'\0';
    } else {
        /* Received a wide character that resembles WEOF; handle error */
    }
}

```

## Exceptions

**FIO34-C-EX1:** A number of C functions do not return characters but can return `EOF` as a status code. These functions include `fclose()`, `fflush()`, `fputs()`, `fscanf()`, `puts()`, `scanf()`, `sscanf()`, `vfscanf()`, and `vscanf()`. These return values can be compared to `EOF` without validating the result.

## Risk Assessment

Incorrectly assuming characters from a file cannot match `EOF` or `WEOF` has resulted in significant vulnerabilities, including command injection attacks. (See the [\\*CA-1996-22](#) advisory.)

Rule	Severity	Likelihood	Remediation Cost	Priority	Level
FIO34-C	High	Probable	Medium	<b>P12</b>	<b>L1</b>

## Automated Detection

Tool	Version	Checker	Description
<a href="#">Axivion Bauhaus Suite</a>	6.9.0	<b>CertC-FIO34</b>	
<a href="#">CodeSonar</a>	5.2p0	<b>LANG.CAST.COERCE</b>	Coercion alters value
<a href="#">Compass /ROSE</a>			
<a href="#">Coverity</a>	2017.07	<b>CHAR_IO</b>	Identifies defects when the return value of <code>fgetc()</code> , <code>getc()</code> , or <code>getchar()</code> is incorrectly assigned to a <code>char</code> instead of an <code>int</code> . Coverity Prevent cannot discover all violations of this rule, so further verification is necessary
<a href="#">ECLAIR</a>	1.2	<b>CC2.FIO34</b>	Partially implemented
<a href="#">Klocwork</a>	2018	<b>CWARN.CMPCHR.EOF</b>	
<a href="#">LDRA tool suite</a>	9.7.1	<b>662 S</b>	Fully implemented
<a href="#">Parasoft C /C++test</a>	10.4.2	<b>CERT_C-FIO34-a</b>	Avoid implicit conversions from wider to narrower types
<a href="#">Polyspace Bug Finder</a>	R2019b	<a href="#">CERT C: Rule FIO34-C</a>	Checks for character values absorbed into EOF (rule partially covered)
<a href="#">PRQA QA-C</a>	9.7	<b>2676, 2678</b>	
<a href="#">PRQA QA-C++</a>	4.4	<b>2676, 2678, 3001, 3010, 3051, 3137, 3717</b>	
<a href="#">Splint</a>	3.1.1		

## Related Vulnerabilities

Search for [vulnerabilities](#) resulting from the violation of this rule on the [CERT website](#).

## Related Guidelines

[Key here](#) (explains table format and definitions)

Taxonomy	Taxonomy item	Relationship
<a href="#">CERT C Secure Coding Standard</a>	<a href="#">STR00-C. Represent characters using an appropriate type</a>	Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship
<a href="#">CERT C Secure Coding Standard</a>	<a href="#">INT31-C. Ensure that integer conversions do not result in lost or misinterpreted data</a>	Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship
<a href="#">CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java</a>	<a href="#">FIO08-J. Use an int to capture the return value of methods that read a character or byte</a>	Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship
<a href="#">ISO/IEC TS 17961:2013</a>	Using character values that are indistinguishable from EOF [chreof]	Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship
<a href="#">CWE 2.11</a>	<a href="#">CWE-197</a>	2017-06-14: CERT: Rule subset of CWE

## CERT-CWE Mapping Notes

[Key here](#) for mapping notes

### CWE-197 and FIO34-C

Independent( FLP34-C, INT31-C) FIO34-C = Subset( INT31-C)

Therefore: FIO34-C = Subset( CWE-197)

## Bibliography

<a href="#">[Kettlewell 2002]</a>	Section 1.2, "<stdio.h> and Character Types"
<a href="#">[NIST 2006]</a>	SAMATE Reference Dataset Test Case ID 000-000-088
<a href="#">[Summit 2005]</a>	Question 12.2

