Dangling pointers can lead to exploitable double-free and access-freed-memory vulnerabilities. A simple yet effective way to eliminate dangling pointers and avoid many memory-related vulnerabilities is to set pointers to NULL
after they are freed or to set them to another valid object.
In this noncompliant code example, the type of a message is used to determine how to process the message itself. It is assumed that message_type
is an integer and message
is a pointer to an array of characters that were allocated dynamically. If message_type
equals value_1
, the message is processed accordingly. A similar operation occurs when message_type
equals value_2
. However, if message_type == value_1
evaluates to true and message_type == value_2
also evaluates to true, then message
is freed twice, resulting in a double-free vulnerability.
char *message; int message_type; /* Initialize message and message_type */ if (message_type == value_1) { /* Process message type 1 */ free(message); } /* ...*/ if (message_type == value_2) { /* Process message type 2 */ free(message); } |
Calling free()
on a null pointer results in no action being taken by free()
. Setting message
to NULL
after it is freed eliminates the possibility that the message
pointer can be used to free the same memory more than once.
char *message; int message_type; /* Initialize message and message_type */ if (message_type == value_1) { /* Process message type 1 */ free(message); message = NULL; } /* ... */ if (message_type == value_2) { /* Process message type 2 */ free(message); message = NULL; } |
MEM01-C-EX1: If a nonstatic variable goes out of scope immediately following the free()
, it is not necessary to clear its value because it is no longer accessible.
void foo(void) { char *str; /* ... */ free(str); return; } |
Setting pointers to NULL
or to another valid value after memory is freed is a simple and easily implemented solution for reducing dangling pointers. Dangling pointers can result in freeing memory multiple times or in writing to memory that has already been freed. Both of these problems can lead to an attacker executing arbitrary code with the permissions of the vulnerable process.
Recommendation | Severity | Likelihood | Remediation Cost | Priority | Level |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
MEM01-C | High | Unlikely | Low | P9 | L2 |
Tool | Version | Checker | Description |
---|---|---|---|
Astrée | Supported: Astrée reports usage of invalid pointers. | ||
Axivion Bauhaus Suite | CertC-MEM01 | Fully implemented | |
CodeSonar | ALLOC.DF | Double free | |
Compass/ROSE | |||
USE_AFTER_FREE | Can detect the specific instances where memory is deallocated more than once or read/written to the target of a freed pointer | ||
LDRA tool suite | 484 S, 112 D | Partially implemented | |
Parasoft C/C++test | CERT_C-MEM01-a | Do not use resources that have been freed | |
Parasoft Insure++ | Detects dangling pointers at runtime | ||
CERT C: Rec. MEM01-C | Checks for missing reset of a freed pointer (rec. fully covered) |
Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.
SEI CERT C++ Coding Standard | VOID MEM01-CPP. Store a valid value in pointers immediately after deallocation |
ISO/IEC TR 24772:2013 | Dangling References to Stack Frames [DCM] Dangling Reference to Heap [XYK] Off-by-one Error [XZH] |
MITRE CWE | CWE-415, Double free CWE-416, Use after free |
[Seacord 2013] | Chapter 4, "Dynamic Memory Management" |
[Plakosh 2005] |