Description -
A programmer should keep a check on the following (sub-sections):
- ânâ > size of âpâ // for func(p,n)
- ânâ and âpâ are not compatible
- ânâ > size of âpâ or size of âqâ || âpâ and âqâ are not compatible // for func(p,q, n)
- âpâ and âqâ are compatible but not with ânâ
- Correct usage of expression E // for E: T* = mem_alloc(n)
This noncompliant code example assigns a value greater than the size of dynamic memory to 'n' which is then passed to the memset().
void f1 (size_t nchars) { char *p = (char *)malloc(nchars); const size_t n = nchars + 1; memset(p, 0, n); /* More program code */ } |
This compliant solution makes sure that the value of 'n' is not greater the size of the dynamic memory pointed to by the pointer 'p':
void f1 (size_t nchars, size_t val) { char *p = (char *)malloc(nchars); const size_t n = val; if (nchars - n < 0) { Â Â Â Â /* Handle Error */ } else { memset(p, 0, n); } /* More program code */ } |
In noncompliant code example the effective type of *p is float while the derived type of the expression 'n' is int.
void f2() { float a[4]; const size_t n= sizeof(int) * 4; void *p = a; memset(p, 0, n); /* More program code */ } |
Note: A possibility of this code being safe would be on architectures where sizeof (int) is equal to sizeof (float).
The derived type of 'n' in this solution is also float.
void f2() { float a[4]; const size_t n= sizeof(float) * 4; void *p = a; memset(p, 0, n); /* More program code */ } |
Depending on the library function called, the attacker may be able to use a heap overflow vulnerability to run arbitrary code. The detection of checks specified in description can be automated but the remediation has to be manual.
Rule |
Severity |
Likelihood |
Remediation Cost |
Priority |
Level |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
ARR38-C |
high |
likely |
medium |
P18 |
L1 |
WG14 Document: N1579 - Rule 5.34 Forming Invalid pointers by library functions.