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File names on many operating systems, including Windows and UNIX, may be used to access special files, which are actually devices. Reserved Microsoft Windows device names include AUX, CON, PRN, COM1, and LPT1 or paths using the \\.\ device namespace. Device files on UNIX systems are used to apply access rights and to direct operations on the files to the appropriate device drivers.

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A Web browser that failed to check for these devices would allow an attacker to create a website with image tags such as <IMG src="file:///dev/mouse"> that would lock the user's mousemouse [Howard 2002].

Noncompliant Code Example

In this noncompliant code example, the user can specify a locked device or a FIFO (first-in, first-out) file name, which can cause the program to hang on the call to fopen():

#include <stdio.h>
 
void func(const char *file_name) {
  FILE *file;
  if ((file = fopen(file_name, "wb")) == NULL) {
    /* Handle error */
  }

  /* Operate on the file */

  if (fclose(file) == EOF) {
    /* Handle error */
  }
}

Compliant Solution (POSIX)

POSIX defines the O_NONBLOCK flag to open(), which ensures that delayed operations on a file do not hang the program [IEEE Std 1003.1:2013].

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When available (Linux 2.1.126+, FreeBSD, Solaris 10, POSIX.1-2008), the O_NOFOLLOW flag should also be used. (see See POS01-C. Check for the existence of links when dealing with files.) . When O_NOFOLLOW is not available, symbolic link checks should use the method from POS35-C. Avoid race conditions while checking for the existence of a symbolic link.

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This code contains an intractable TOCTOU (time-of-check, time-of-use) race condition under which an attacker can alter the file referenced by file_name following the call to lstat() but before the call to open(). The switch will be discovered after the file is opened, but opening the file cannot be prevented in the case where this action itself causes undesired behavior. (see See FIO45-C. Avoid TOCTOU race conditions while accessing files for more information about TOCTOU race conditions.).

Essentially, an attacker can switch out a file for one of the file types shown in the following table with the specified effect.

File Types and Effects

To be compliant with this rule and to prevent this TOCTOU race condition, file_name must refer to a file in a secure directory. (see See FIO15-C. Ensure that file operations are performed in a secure directory.).

Noncompliant Code Example (Windows)

This noncompliant code example uses the GetFileType() function to attempt to prevent opening a special file: 

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Although tempting, the Win32 GetFileType() function is dangerous in this case. If the file name given identifies a named pipe that is currently blocking on a read request, the call to GetFileType() will block until the read request completes. This provides an effective attack vector for a denial-of-service attack on the application. Furthermore, the act of opening a file handle may cause side effects, such as line states being set to their default voltage when opening a serial device.

Compliant Solution (Windows)

Microsoft documents a list of reserved identifiers that represent devices and have a device namespace to be used specifically by devices [MSDN]. In this compliant solution, the isReservedName() function can be used to determine if a specified path refers to a device. Care must be taken to avoid a TOCTOU race condition when first testing a path name using the isReservedName() function and then later operating on that path name.

#include <ctype.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>

static bool isReservedName(const char *path) {
  /* This list of reserved names comes from MSDN */
  static const char *reserved[] = {
    "nul", "con", "prn", "aux", "com1", "com2", "com3",
    "com4", "com5", "com6", "com7", "com8", "com9",
    "lpt1", "lpt2", "lpt3", "lpt4", "lpt5", "lpt6",
    "lpt7", "lpt8", "lpt9"
  };
  bool ret = false;

/*
 * First, check to see if this is a device namespace, which
 * always starts with \\.\, because device namespaces are not
 * valid file paths.
 */

  if (!path || 0 == strncmp(path, "\\\\.\\", 4)) {
    return true;
  }

  /* Compare against the list of ancient reserved names */
  for (size_t i = 0; !ret &&
       i < sizeof(reserved) / sizeof(*reserved); ++i) {
   /*
    * Because Windows uses a case-insensitive file system, operate on
    * a lowercase version of the given filename. Note: This ignores
    * globalization issues and assumes ASCII characters.
    */
    if (0 == _stricmp(path, reserved[i])) {
      ret = true;
    }
  }
  return ret;
}

Risk Assessment

Exceptions

FIO32-C-EX1: These checks are intended for opening files specified by a user (or an untrusted source). Intentionally opening device files does not violate this rule.

Risk Assessment

Allowing operations that are appropriate only for regular files to be performed on devices can result in denial-of-service attacks or more serious exploits depending on the platform.

Automated Detection

Related Vulnerabilities

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.

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Related Guidelines

Key here (explains table format and definitions)

CERT-CWE Mapping Notes

Key here for mapping notes

CWE-67 and FIO32-C

FIO32-C = Union( CWE-67, list) where list =

• Treating trusted device names like regular files in Windows.

• Treating device names (both trusted and untrusted) like regular files in POSIX

Bibliography

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