
...
where the integer expression size
and the declaration of vla
are both evaluated at runtime. If the size argument supplied to a variable length array is not a positive integer value, the behavior is undefined. (See undefined behavior 7572.) Additionally, if the magnitude of the argument is excessive, the program may behave in an unexpected way. An attacker may be able to leverage this behavior to overwrite critical program data [Griffiths 2006]. The programmer must ensure that size arguments to variable length arrays, especially those derived from untrusted data, are in a valid range.
Because variable length arrays are a conditionally supported feature of C11, their use in portable code should be guarded by testing the value of the macro __STDC_NO_VLA__
. Implementations that do not support variable length arrays indicate it by setting __STDC_NO_VLA__
to the integer constant 1.
Noncompliant Code Example
In this noncompliant code example, a variable length array of size size
is declared. The size
is declared as size_t
in compliance with INT01-C. Use rsizesize_t or sizersize_t for all integer values representing the size of an object.
Code Block | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
| ||||
#include <stddef.h> extern void do_work(int *array, size_t size); void func(size_t size) { int vla[size]; do_work(vla, size); } |
...
Code Block | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
| ||||
#include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> enum { N1 = 4096 }; void *func(size_t n2) { typedef int A[n2][N1]; A *array = malloc(sizeof(A)); if (!array) { /* Handle error */ return NULL; } for (size_t i = 0; i != n2; ++i) { memset(array[i], 0, N1 * sizeof(int)); } return array; } |
Furthermore, this code also violates ARR39-C. Do not add or subtract a scaled integer to a pointer, where array
is a pointer to the two-dimensional array, where it should really be a pointer to the latter dimension instead. This means that the memset()
call does out-of-bounds writes on all of its invocations except the first.
Compliant Solution (sizeof
)
This compliant solution prevents sizeof
wrapping by detecting the condition before it occurs and avoiding the subsequent computation when the condition is detected. The code also uses an additional typedef to fix the type of array
so that memset()
never writes past the two-dimensional array.
Code Block | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
| ||||
#include <stdint.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> enum { N1 = 4096 }; void *func(size_t n2) { if (n2 > SIZE_MAX / (N1 * sizeof(int))) { /* Prevent sizeof wrapping */ return NULL; } typedef int A1[N1]; typedef A1 A[n2][N1]; AA1 *array = (A1*) malloc(sizeof(A)); if (!array) { /* Handle error */ return NULL; } for (size_t i = 0; i != n2; ++i) { memset(array[i], 0, N1 * sizeof(int)); } return array; } |
...
Failure to properly specify the size of a variable length array may allow arbitrary code execution or result in stack exhaustion.
Rule | Severity | Likelihood |
---|
Detectable | Repairable | Priority | Level |
---|---|---|---|
ARR32-C | High | Probable | No |
No | P6 | L2 |
Automated Detection
Tool | Version | Checker | Description | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CodeSonar |
| ALLOC.SIZE.IOFLOW | Integer Overflow of Allocation Size | ||||||
Coverity |
|
| REVERSE_NEGATIVE | Fully implemented | |||||||
Cppcheck |
| negativeArraySize | |||||||
Cppcheck Premium |
| negativeArraySize premium-cert-arr32-c | |||||||
Helix QAC |
| C1051 | |||||||
Klocwork |
| MISRA.ARRAY.VAR_LENGTH.2012 | |||||||
LDRA tool suite |
| 621 S | Enhanced enforcement |
Size of the variable-length array (VLA) is from an unsecure source and may be zero, negative, or too large
Will warn only if given size is negative
Parasoft C/C++test |
| CERT_C-ARR32-a | Ensure the size of the variable length array is in valid range | ||||||
PC-lint Plus |
| 9035 | Assistance provided | ||||||
Polyspace Bug Finder |
| Checks for:
Rule fully covered. | |||||||
Security Reviewer - Static Reviewer | 6.02 | C101 | Fully Implemented | ||||||
TrustInSoft Analyzer |
| alloca_bounds | Exhaustively verified. |
Related Vulnerabilities
Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.
Related Guidelines
Key here (explains table format and definitions)
Taxonomy | Taxonomy item | Relationship |
---|---|---|
CERT C Secure Coding Standard | INT01-C. Use rsize_t or size_t for all integer values representing the size of an object | Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship |
ISO/IEC TR 24772:2013 | Unchecked Array Indexing [XYZ] | Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship |
ISO/IEC TS 17961:2013 | Tainted, potentially mutilated, or out-of-domain integer values are used in a restricted sink [taintsink] | Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship |
CWE 2.11 | CWE-758 | 2017-06-29: CERT: Rule subset of CWE |
CERT-CWE Mapping Notes
Key here for mapping notes
CWE-129 and ARR32-C
Intersection( CWE-188, EXP39-C) = Ø
ARR32-C addresses specifying the size of a variable-length array (VLA). CWE-129 addresses invalid array indices, not array sizes.
CWE-758 and ARR32-C
Independent( INT34-C, INT36-C, MSC37-C, FLP32-C, EXP33-C, EXP30-C, ERR34-C, ARR32-C)
CWE-758 = Union( ARR32-C, list) where list =
- Undefined behavior that results from anything other than too large a VLA dimension.
CWE-119 and ARR32-C
- Intersection( CWE-119, ARR32-C) = Ø
- ARR32-C is not about providing a valid buffer but reading/writing outside it. It is about providing an invalid buffer, or one that exhausts the stack.
Bibliography
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