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If not properly performed, checking for the existence of symbolic links can lead to race conditions.
This rule is a specific instance of rule FIO45-C. Avoid TOCTOU race conditions while accessing files.
Noncompliant Code Example
The POSIX lstat() function collects information about a symbolic link rather than its target. This noncompliant code example uses the lstat() function to collect information about the file, checks the st_mode field to determine if the file is a symbolic link, and then opens the file if it is not a symbolic link.:
| Code Block | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ||||
char *filename = /* file name */;
char *userbuf = /* user data */;
unsigned int userlen = /* length of userbuf string */;
struct stat lstat_info;
int fd;
/* ... */
if (lstat(filename, &lstat_info) == -1) {
/* Handle error */
}
if (!S_ISLNK(lstat_info.st_mode)) {
fd = open(filename, O_RDWR);
if (fd == -1) {
/* Handle error */
}
}
if (write(fd, userbuf, userlen) < userlen) {
/* Handle error */
}
|
This code contains a time-of-check, time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition between the call to lstat() and the subsequent call to open() because both functions operate on a file name that can be manipulated asynchronously to the execution of the program. (See FIO01-C. Be careful using functions that use file names for identification.)
Compliant Solution (POSIX.1-2008 or newer)
This compliant solution eliminates the race condition by using O_NOFOLLOW to cause open() to fail if passed a symbolic link, avoiding the TOCTOU by not having a separate "check" and "use":
| Code Block | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ||||
char *filename = /* file name */;
char *userbuf = /* user data */;
unsigned int userlen = /* length of userbuf string */;
int fd = open(filename, O_RDWR|O_NOFOLLOW);
if (fd == -1) {
/* Handle error */
}
if (write(fd, userbuf, userlen) < userlen) {
/* Handle error */
} |
Compliant Solution (POSIX.1-2001 or older)
This compliant solution eliminates the race condition by
- Calling calling
lstat()on the file name. - calling Calling
open()to open the file. - calling Calling
fstat()on the file descriptor returned byopen(). - comparing Comparing the file information returned by the calls to
lstat()andfstat()to ensure that the files are the same.
...
Comparing i-nodes, using the st_ino fields, and devices, using the st_dev fields, ensures that the file passed to lstat() is the same as the file passed to fstat(). (See FIO05-C. Identify files using multiple file attributes.)
Risk Assessment
TOCTOU race condition vulnerabilities can be exploited to gain elevated privileges.
Rule | Severity | Likelihood |
|---|
Detectable | Repairable | Priority | Level |
|---|---|---|---|
POS35-C |
High | Likely |
No |
No |
P9 |
L2 |
Automated Detection
Tool | Version | Checker | Description | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Astrée |
| user_defined | Soundly supported | ||||||
| Axivion Bauhaus Suite |
| CertC-POS35 | |||||||
| Compass/ROSE |
Can detect some violations of this rule. In particular, it ensures that calls to | |||||||||
| Coverity |
| TOCTOU | Implemented | ||||||
| Helix QAC |
| DF4886, DF4887, DF4888 | |||||||
| Klocwork |
| SV.TOCTOU.FILE_ACCESS | |||||||
| Parasoft C/C++test |
| CERT_C-POS35-b | Avoid race conditions while checking for the existence of a symbolic link | ||||||
| Polyspace Bug Finder |
| CERT C: Rule POS35-C | Checks for file access between time of check and use (TOCTOU) (rule fully covered) |
Related Vulnerabilities
Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.
Related Guidelines
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ISO/IEC 9899:2011 Section 7.21, "Input/output <stdio.h>"
MITRE CWE: CWE-363, "Race Condition Enabling Link Following"
MITRE CWE: CWE-365, "Race Condition in Switch"
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Key here (explains table format and definitions)
Taxonomy | Taxonomy item | Relationship |
|---|---|---|
| CWE 2.11 | CWE-363, Race condition enabling link following | 2017-07-07: CERT: Exact |
CERT-CWE Mapping Notes
Key here for mapping notes
CWE-764 and POS51-C/POS35-C
Independent( CWE-764, POS51-C, POS35-C)
CWE-764 is about semaphores, or objects capable of being locked multiple times. Deadlock arises from multiple locks being acquired in a cyclic order, and generally does not arise from semaphores or recursive mutexes.
Bibliography
| [Dowd 2006] | Chapter 9, "UNIX 1: Privileges and Files" |
| [ISO/IEC 9899:2024] | Section 7.23, "Input/output <stdio.h>" |
| [Open Group 2004] | lstat() |
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| 2013] | Chapter |
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| 8, "File I/O" |
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