Page History

...

• The classical US-ASCII characters (0 to 0x7f) encode as themselves, so files and strings that are encoded with ASCII values have the same encoding under both ASCII and UTF-8.
• All UCS characters beyond (0x7f) are encoded as a multibyte sequence consisting only of bytes in the range of 0x80 to 0xfd. This means that no ASCII byte (including a null byte) can appear as part of another character. This property supports the use of string-handling functions.
• It is easy to convert between UTF-8 and UCS-2 and UCS-4 fixed-width representations of characters.
• The lexicographic sorting order of UCS-4 strings is preserved.
• All possible 2^31 2^21 UCS codes can be encoded using UTF-8.

Generally, programs should validate UTF-8 data before performing other checks. The following table lists all valid the well-formed UTF-8 byte sequences.

Although UTF-8 originated from the Plan 9 developers [Pike 1993], Plan 9's own support covers only the low 16-bit range. In general, many "Unicode" systems support only the low 16-bit range, not the full 3121-bit ISO 10646 code space [ISO/IEC 10646:2003(E)2012].

Security-Related Issues

According to to RFC 2279: UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646 [Yergeau 1998],

Implementors of UTF-8 need to consider the security aspects of how they handle invalid UTF-8 sequences. It is conceivable that, in some circumstances, an attacker would be able to exploit an incautious UTF-8 parser by sending it an octet sequence that is not permitted by the UTF-8 syntax.

A particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser that performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain invalid octet sequences as characters. For example, a parser might prohibit the null character when encoded as the single-octet sequence 00, but allow the invalid two-octet sequence C0 80 and interpret it as a null character. Another example might be a parser which prohibits the octet sequence 2F 2E 2E 2F ("/../"), yet permits the invalid octet sequence 2F C0 AE 2E 2F.

Following are more specific recommendations.

Accept Only the Shortest Form

Only the "shortest" form of UTF-8 should be permitted. Naive decoders might accept encodings that are longer than necessary, allowing for potentially dangerous input to have multiple representations. For example,

...

Corrigendum #1: UTF-8 Shortest Form to the Unicode Standard [Unicode 2006] describes modifications made to version 3.0 of the Unicode Standard necessary to define what is meant by the shortest formto forbid the interpretation of the nonshortest forms.

Handling Invalid Inputs

UTF-8 decoders have no uniformly defined behavior upon encountering an invalid input. Following are several ways a UTF-8 decoder might behave in the event of an invalid byte sequence:. Note that implementing these behaviors requires careful security considerations. 

1. Substitute for the replacement character "U+FFFD" or the wildcard character such as "?" when U+FFFD is not availableInsert a replacement character (e.g., ?, the wildcard character).
2. Ignore the bytes (for example, delete the invalid byte before the validation process; see "Unicode Technical Report #36, 3.5 Deletion of Code Points" for more information).
3. Interpret the bytes according to a different character encoding (often the ISO-8859-1 character map; other encoding, such as Shift_JIS, is known to trigger self-XSS, and so is potentially dangerous).
4. Fail to notice but decode as if the bytes were some similar bit of UTF-8.
5. Stop decoding and report an error.

...

int spc_utf8_isvalid(const unsigned char *input) {
  int nb;
  const unsigned char *c = input;

  for (c = input;  *c;  c += (nb + 1)) {
    if (!(*c & 0x80)) nb = 0;
    else if ((*c & 0xc0) == 0x80) return 0;
    else if ((*c & 0xe0) == 0xc0) nb = 1;
    else if ((*c & 0xf0) == 0xe0) nb = 2;
    else if ((*c & 0xf8) == 0xf0) nb = 3;
    else if ((*c & 0xfc) == 0xf8) nb = 4;
    else if ((*c & 0xfe) == 0xfc) nb = 5;
    while (nb-- > 0)
      if ((*(c + nb) & 0xc0) != 0x80) return 0;
  }
  return 1;
}

Broken Surrogates

Encoding of individual or out-of-order surrogate halves should not be permitted. Broken surrogates are invalid in Unicode and introduce ambiguity when they appear in Unicode data. Broken surrogates are often signs of bad data transmission. They can also indicate internal bugs in an application or intentional efforts to find security vulnerabilities.

Risk Assessment

Failing to properly handle UTF8-encoded data can result in a data integrity violation or denial-of-service attack.

Automated Detection

Related Vulnerabilities

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.

Related Guidelines

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

Bibliography

...

...

...

...

Image Modified Image Modified Image Modified