Page History

Many file-related security vulnerabilities result from a program accessing a an unintended file object different from the one intended. In ISO/IEC 9899-1999 C character-based because file names are only loosely bound to underlying file objects in name only. File names provide no information regarding the nature of the file object itself. Furthermore, the binding of a file name to a file object is reasserted every time the file name is used in an operation. File descriptors and FILE pointers are bound to underlying file objects by the operating system. (See FIO03-C. Do not make assumptions about fopen() and file creation.)

Accessing files via file descriptors or FILE pointers rather than file names provides a greater level degree of certainty with regard as to the which object that is actually acted onupon. It is recommended that files be accessed through file descriptors or FILE pointers where possible.

Non-Compliant Code Example

The following C functions rely solely on file names for file identification:

• remove()
• rename()
• fopen()
• freopen()

Use these functions with caution. See FIO10-C. Take care when using the rename() function, and FIO08-C. Take care when calling remove() on an open file.

Noncompliant Code Example

In this noncompliant code example, the file identified by file_name is opened, processed, closed, and removed. However, it is possible that the file object identified by file_name in the call to remove() is not the same file object identified by file_name in the call to fopen().

char *file_name;
FILE *f_ptr;

/* Initialize file_name */

f_ptr = fopen(file_name, "w");
if (f_ptr == NULL) {
  /* Handle error */
}

/*... Process file ...*/

if (fclose(f_ptr) != 0) {
  /* Handle error */
}

if (remove(file_name) != 0) {
  /* Handle error */
}

Compliant Solution

Not much can be done programmatically to ensure the file removed is the same file that was opened, processed, and closed except to make sure that the file is opened in a secure directory with privileges that would prevent the file from being manipulated by an untrusted user. (See FIO15-C. Ensure that file operations are performed in a secure directory.)

Noncompliant Code Example (POSIX)

In this noncompliant code In this example, the function chmod() is called to set the permissions of a file. However, it is not clear whether the file object referred to by file_name refers to the same object in the call to fopen() and in the call to chmod().

...
char *file_name;
FILE * f_ptr;

/* Initialize file_name */

f_ptr = fopen(file_name, "w");
if (!f_ptr == NULL)  {
  /* Handle fopen() Errorerror */
}

/* ... */

if (chmod(file_name, newS_modeIRUSR) == -1) {
  /* Handle chmod()error Error */
}
/* Process file */

Compliant Solution (POSIX)

This compliant solution uses variants of the functions used in the non-compliant code example that operate on file descriptors or file pointers rather than file names. This the POSIX fchmod() and open() functions [IEEE Std 1003.1:2013]. Using these functions guarantees that the file opened is the same file that is operated on.

...char *file_name;
int fd;

/* Initialize file_name */

fd = open(
  file_name,
  O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL,
  fileS_modeIRWXU
);

if (fd == -1) {
  /* Handle open() error */
}

/* ... */

if (fchmod(fd, newS_modeIRUSR) == -1) {
  /* Handle fchmod() Errorerror */
}
/* Process file */
...

...

Mitigation Strategies (POSIX)

Many file-related race conditions can be eliminated by using

• fchown() rather than chown()
• fstat() rather than stat()
• fchmod() rather than chmod()

or simply by ensuring the security of the working directory per FIO15-C. Ensure that file operations are performed in a secure directory.

POSIX functions that have no file descriptor counterpart should be used with caution:

• link() and unlink()
• mkdir() and rmdir()
• mount() and unmount()
• lstat()
• mknod()
• symlink()
• utime()

Risk Assessment

Many file-related vulnerabilities, for instance Time of Check Time of Use such as time-of-check, time-of-use (TOCTOU) race conditions, are can be exploited to cause a program to access an unintended file. Using FILE pointers or file descriptors to identify files instead of file names reduces the chance of accessing an unintended file. Remediation costs are medium because, although insecure functions can be high, because there is no portable secure solution.easily identified, simple drop-in replacements are not always available.

Automated Detection

Related Vulnerabilities

Search for Examples of vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this recommendation can be found rule on the CERT website.

References

Related Guidelines

Bibliography

...

Image Added Image Added Image Added Wiki Markup\[[Seacord 05|AA. C References#Seacord 05]\] Chapter 7, "File I/O" \[[ISO/IEC 9899-1999|AA. C References#ISO/IEC 9899-1999]\] Section 7.19.3, "Files" \[[ISO/IEC 9899-1999|AA. C References#ISO/IEC 9899-1999]\] Section 7.19.4, "Operations on Files" \[[Apple Secure Coding Guide | http://developer.apple.com/documentation/Security/Conceptual/SecureCodingGuide/Articles/RaceConditions.html]\] "Avoiding Race Conditions and Insecure File Operations" \[[Open Group 04|AA. C References#Open Group 04]\] "The open function" \[[Drepper 06|AA. C References#Drepper 06]\] Section 2.2.1 "Identification When Opening"