An object is partially initialized if a constructor has begun building the object but has not finished. As long as the object is not fully initialized, it must be hidden from other classes.
Other classes might access a partially initialized object from concurrently running threads. This rule is a specific instance of TSM01-J. Do not let the this reference escape during object construction but focuses only on single-threaded programs. Multithreaded programs must also comply with TSM03-J. Do not publish partially initialized objects.
Some uses of variables require failure atomicity. This requirement typically arises when a variable constitutes an aggregation of different objects, for example, a composition-and-forwarding-based approach, as described in OBJ02-J. Preserve dependencies in subclasses when changing superclasses. In the absence of failure atomicity, the object can be left in an inconsistent state as a result of partial initialization.
There are three common approaches to dealing with the problem of partially initialized objects:
- Exception in constructor. This approach throws an exception in the object's constructor. Unfortunately, an attacker can maliciously obtain the instance of such an object. For example, an attack that uses the finalizer construct allows an attacker to invoke arbitrary methods within the class, even if the class methods are protected by a security manager.
- Final field. Declaring the variable that is initialized to the object as
finalprevents the object from being partially initialized. The compiler produces a warning when there is a possibility that the variable's object might not be fully initialized. Declaring the variable
finalalso guarantees initialization safety in multithreaded code. According to The Java Language Specification (JLS), §17.5, "
finalField Semantics" [JLS 2015], "An object is considered to be completely initialized when its constructor finishes. A thread that can only see a reference to an object after that object has been completely initialized is guaranteed to see the correctly initialized values for that object's final fields." In other words, when a constructor executing in one thread initializes a final field to a known safe value, other threads are unable to see the preinitialized values of the object.
- Initialized flag. This approach allows uninitialized or partially initialized objects to exist in a known failed state; such objects are commonly known as zombie objects. This solution is error prone because any access to such a class must first check whether the object has been correctly initialized.
The following table summarizes these three approaches:
Partially Initialized Objects
Exception in constructor
Does not prevent
Noncompliant Code Example (Finalizer Attack)
This noncompliant code example, based on an example by Kabutz [Kabutz 2001], defines the constructor of the
BankOperations class so that it performs social security number (SSN) verification using the method
performSSNVerification(). The implementation of the
performSSNVerification() method assumes that an attacker does not know the correct SSN and trivially returns false.
The constructor throws a
SecurityException when SSN verification fails. The
UserApp class appropriately catches this exception and displays an "Access Denied" message. However, these precautions fail to prevent a malicious program from invoking methods of the partially initialized class
BankOperations, as shown by the following exploit code.
The goal of the attack is to capture a reference to the partially initialized object of the
BankOperations class. If a malicious subclass catches the
SecurityException thrown by the
BankOperations constructor, it is unable to further exploit the vulnerable code because the new object instance has gone out of scope. Instead, an attacker can exploit this code by extending the
BankOperations class and overriding the
finalize() method. This attack intentionally violates MET12-J. Do not use finalizers.
When the constructor throws an exception, the garbage collector waits to grab the object reference. However, the object cannot be garbage-collected until after the finalizer completes its execution. The attacker's finalizer obtains and stores a reference by using the
this keyword. Consequently, the attacker can maliciously invoke any instance method on the base class by using the stolen instance reference. This attack can even bypass a check by a security manager.
Compliance with ERR00-J. Do not suppress or ignore checked exceptions and ERR03-J. Restore prior object state on method failure can help to ensure that fields are appropriately initialized in catch blocks. A developer who explicitly initializes the variable to
null is more likely to document this behavior so that other programmers or clients include the appropriate null reference checks where required. Moreover, this approach guarantees initialization safety in a multithreaded scenario.
Compliant Solution (Final)
This compliant solution declares the partially initialized class final so that it cannot be extended:
Compliant Solution (Final
If the class itself cannot be declared final, it can still thwart the finalizer attack by declaring its own
finalize() method and making it final:
This solution is allowed under exception MET12-J-EX1, which permits a class to use an empty final finalizer to prevent a finalizer attack.
Compliant Solution (Java SE 6, Public and Private Constructors)
This compliant solution applies to Java SE 6 and later versions in which the JVM will not execute an object's finalizer if the object's constructor throws an exception before the
java.lang.Object constructor exits [SCG 2009]. Developers can use this feature to throw an exception in a constructor without risking the escape of a partially initialized object (via the finalizer attack described previously). However, doing so requires a careful coding of the constructor because Java ensures that the
java.lang.Object constructor executes on or before the first statement of any constructor. If the first statement in a constructor is a call to either a superclass's constructor or another constructor in the same class, then the
java.lang.Object constructor will be executed somewhere in that call. Otherwise, Java will execute the default constructor of the superclass before any of the constructor's code and the
java.lang.Object constructor will be executed through that (implicit) invocation.
Consequently, to execute potentially exception-raising checks before the
java.lang.Object constructor exits, the programmer must place them in an argument expression of an explicit constructor invocation. For example, the single constructor can be split into three parts: a public constructor whose interface remains unchanged, a private constructor that takes (at least) one argument and performs the actual work of the original constructor, and a method that performs the checks. The public constructor invokes the private constructor on its first line while invoking the method as an argument expression. All code in the expression will be executed before the private constructor, ensuring that any exceptions will be raised before the
java.lang.Object constructor is invoked.
This compliant solution demonstrates the design. Note that the
performSSNVerification() method is modified to throw an exception rather than returning false if the security check fails.
Compliant Solution (Initialized Flag)
Rather than throwing an exception, this compliant solution uses an initialized flag to indicate whether an object was successfully constructed. The flag is initialized to false and set to true when the constructor finishes successfully.
The initialized flag prevents any attempt to access the object's methods if the object is not fully constructed. Because each method must check the initialized flag to detect a partially constructed object, this solution imposes a speed penalty on the program. It is also harder to maintain because it is easy for a maintainer to add a method that fails to check the initialized flag.
According to Charlie Lai [Lai 2008]:
If an object is only partially initialized, its internal fields likely contain safe default values such as
null. Even in an untrusted environment, such an object is unlikely to be useful to an attacker. If the developer deems the partially initialized object state secure, then the developer doesn't have to pollute the class with the flag. The flag is necessary only when such a state isn't secure or when accessible methods in the class perform sensitive operations without referencing any internal field.
The initialized flag is volatile to ensure that the setting of the flag to true happens-before any reads of the variable. The current code does not allow for multiple threads to read the field before the constructor terminates, but this object could always be subclassed and run in an environment where multiple threads can access the variable.
Noncompliant Code Example (Static Variable)
This noncompliant code example uses a nonfinal static variable. The JLS does not mandate complete initialization and safe publication even though a static initializer has been used. Note that in the event of an exception during initialization, the variable can be incorrectly initialized.
Compliant Solution (Final Static Variable)
This compliant solution guarantees safe publication by declaring the
Stock field final:
Unlike the previous compliant solution, however, this approach permits a possibly null value but guarantees that a non-null value refers to a completely initialized object.
Allowing access to a partially initialized object can provide an attacker with an opportunity to resurrect the object before or during its finalization; as a result, the attacker can bypass security checks.
Automated detection for this rule is infeasible in the general case. Some instances of nonfinal classes whose constructors can throw exceptions could be straightforward to diagnose.
|CERT.OBJ11.EPNFC||Do not throw exceptions from constructors of "public" non-"final" classes|
CVE-2008-5353 describes a collection of vulnerabilities in Java. In one of the vulnerabilities, an applet causes an object to be deserialized using
ObjectInputStream.readObject(), but the input is controlled by an attacker. The object actually read is a serializable subclass of
ClassLoader, and it has a
readObject() method that stashes the object instance into a static variable; consequently, the object survives the serialization. As a result, the applet manages to construct a
ClassLoader object by passing the restrictions against this in an applet, and the
ClassLoader allows it to construct classes that are not subject to the security restrictions of an applet. This vulnerability is described in depth in SER08-J. Minimize privileges before deserializing from a privileged context.
Guideline 4-5 / EXTEND-5: Limit the extensibility of classes and methods
Section 9.5, "The Finalize Method"
Section 3.3, "Destroying and Finalizing Objects"
Issue 032, "Exceptional Constructors—Resurrecting the Dead"
"Java Insecurity: Accounting for Subtleties That Can Compromise Code"
|[Masson 2011]||"Secure Your Code against the Finalizer Vulnerability"|