Dangling pointers can lead to exploitable double-free and access-freed-memory vulnerabilities. A simple yet effective way to eliminate dangling pointers and avoid many memory-related vulnerabilities is to set pointers to NULL after they have been they are freed or to set them to another valid object.
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In this noncompliant code example, the type of a message is used to determine how to process the message itself. It is assumed that message_type is an integer and message is a pointer to an array of characters that were allocated dynamically. If message_type equals value_1, the message is processed accordingly. A similar operation occurs when message_type equals value_2. However, if message_type == value_1 evaluates to true and message_type == value_2 also evaluates to true, then message is freed twice, resulting in a double-free vulnerability.
| Code Block | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ||||
char *message;
int message_type;
/* Initialize message and message_type */
if (message_type == value_1) {
/* Process message type 1 */
free(message);
}
/* ...*/
if (message_type == value_2) {
/* Process message type 2 */
free(message);
}
|
...
Calling free() on a null pointer results in no action being taken by free(). Setting message to NULL after it has been is freed eliminates the possibility that the message pointer can be used to free the same memory more than once.
| Code Block | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ||||
char *message; int message_type; /* initializeInitialize message and message_type */ if (message_type == value_1) { /* Process message type 1 */ free(message); message = NULL; } /* ... */ if (message_type == value_2) { /* Process message type 2 */ free(message); message = NULL; } |
Exceptions
MEM01-C-EX1: If a nonstatic variable goes out of scope immediately following the free(), it is not necessary to clear its value because it is no longer accessible.
| Code Block | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ||||
void foo(void) {
char *str;
/* ... */
free(str);
return;
}
|
Risk Assessment
Setting pointers to NULL or to another valid value after memory has been memory is freed is a simple and easily implemented solution for reducing dangling pointers. Dangling pointers can result in freeing memory multiple times or in writing to memory that has already been freed. Both of these problems can lead to an attacker executing arbitrary code with the permissions of the vulnerable process.
Recommendation | Severity | Likelihood | Detectable |
|---|
Repairable | Priority | Level |
|---|---|---|
MEM01-C |
High | Unlikely |
Yes |
Yes | P9 | L2 |
Automated Detection
Tool | Version | Checker | Description |
|---|
| Section |
|---|
Compass/ROSE |
| Section |
|---|
| Astrée |
| Supported: Astrée reports usage of invalid pointers. | |||||||
| Axivion Bauhaus Suite |
| CertC-MEM01 | Fully implemented | ||||||
| CodeSonar |
| ALLOC.DF | Double free | ||||||
| Compass/ROSE | |||||||||
|
USE_AFTER_FREE |
Can detect the specific instances where |
memory is deallocated more than once or |
read/ |
written to the target of a freed pointer | |||||||||
| Helix QAC |
| C3005 | |||||||
| LDRA tool suite |
| 484 S, 112 D | Partially implemented | ||||||
| Parasoft C/C++test |
| CERT_C-MEM01-a | Do not use resources that have been freed | ||||||
| Parasoft Insure++ | Detects dangling pointers at runtime | ||||||||
| CERT C: Rec. MEM01-C | Checks for missing reset of a freed pointer (rec. fully covered) |
Related Vulnerabilities
Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.
Related Guidelines
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| TR 24772:2013 | Dangling References to Stack Frames [DCM] Dangling Reference to Heap [XYK] Off-by-one Error |
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| [XZH] |
| MITRE CWE |
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Bibliography
| [Seacord 2013] | Chapter 4, "Dynamic Memory Management" |
| [Plakosh 2005] |
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MITRE CWE: CWE-415, "Double Free"
Bibliography
| Wiki Markup |
|---|
\[[Seacord 2005a|AA. Bibliography#Seacord 05]\] Chapter 4, "Dynamic Memory Management"
\[[Plakosh 2005|AA. Bibliography#Plakosh 05]\] |